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Killer robots are no longer a facet of science fiction, but rather an imminent reality. The
development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) has been something states and military
operations have been working towards to build their arsenal and change the landscape of
conflict. With this changing landscape, these AWS fit within public international law in a unique
way, existing somewhere in between a weapon and a combatant. With increased autonomy and
diminished human control over their behaviour, AWS present an interesting dilemma to existing
international legal structures, as they are typically written in a fashion designed to be adhered by
humans, not machines. In order to better understand and solidify the place of AWS within these
structures, this paper will analyze legal scholars’ works regarding AWS in armed conflict.
Within the defined boundaries set forth in the international regulatory legal structures, this paper
will provide analysis situated in context in order to provide a more grounded interpretation of
AWS within these structures. literature review seeks to draw conclusions from these authors and
their work, and how they contribute to finding a place for AWS within the existing international
legal structures.
This literature review will look at these existing legal structures, specifically the 1977
Additional Protocol I (API) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, as it broadly and holistically
covers the norms and principles that must be adhered to in conflict. The norms and principles of
international law set forth in the API are analyzed in terms of how AWS fit within these
structures, identifying aspects and characteristics of the systems that would allow them to
perform certain tasks, such as their ability to perform lawful attacks. Possible avenues for which
AWS can be included in the clauses and definitions presented in these Conventions and
principles are also provided, identifying that these weapons can be interpreted into these
structures based on their autonomous system and weapons features, such as munition and
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sensors. Specifically, the principles of discretion and proportionality are explored and the
capabilities of AWS are analyzed as to whether they are actually able to comply with these
principles. Components such as sensors and decision-making software are used to identify
targets and perform proportionality calculations in order to adhere with these principles, though
with varying levels of compliance confidence.
This literature review delves into the two different avenues of attributing responsibility
for the actions of AWS. One option is the developers of the AWS, who designed and
programmed the system with set parameters and code that determines its decision-making and
action capabilities. More specifically, these developers ultimately determine how the AWS will
perform its tasks, and therefore vicariously contribute to the acts it commits. However, these
developers are also too far removed from the acts and their creation, and some aspects of the
autonomous features diminish the influence of the developers over the AWS’s behaviour.
Another option for attributing responsibility is the military commander who deployed the
weapon and has command responsibility over the AWS. Since the decision is deliberate on the
part of the military commanders to ultimately deploy the AWS, they must be responsible for
their actions on the battlefield, and should take all reasonable steps to ensure the AWS is in the
best state to perform its military objectives.
WHERE DO THEY FIT? EXPLORING AWS’S PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
It is important to understand the current landscape of international law, which provides
the foundation for interpreting how AWS fit within these existing structures. International law
exists in four branches: the law of state responsibility, the law on the use of force, international
humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law.1 This section of this paper will focus primarily on

1

Denise Garcia, "Killer Robots: Why the US should Lead the Ban," Global Policy Volume 6, Issue 1 (2015): 60.
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the law on the use of force, or law of armed conflict (LOAC), and IHL. International law
concerning conduct in war focuses on human soldiers and their use of weapons and other force.2
In other words, much of the language coded in the current international legal structures focuses
on characteristics such as reasonability and common sense, which are traditionally associated as
innately human characteristics and therefore create a difficulty in translating them for an AWS.
Currently, there are no laws or treaties that explicitly provide governance on AWS, but rather
regarding use of force and weapons as a whole.3 Aspects of AWS are covered within existing
legislation that deal with the projection of force, specific technologies and practices, and
interpretations of IHL and principles of the LOAC.4 For example, the principle of distinction –
which will be discussed in length later in this section – requires that combatants distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military
objectives, and thus only attack military objectives.5 Therefore, a weapon such the US Air
Force’s Low Cost Autonomous Attack system, which is capable of searching for and identifying
targets, is capable of complying with this principle as it is capable of identifying a military
target.6 Thus, although AWS are not explicitly named in this principle, there is still the
possibility of interpreting the law to match with the capabilities of an AWS.
Another aspect of international law is the concept of good governance. Good governance
has been described by Gary Marchant et al. – who are members of the Autonomous Robotics
group of the Consortium on Emerging Technologies, Military Operations, and National Security,
and individually conduct research in legal and robotic ethics – as realistic, holistic, inclusive,
Gary E. Marchant, Braden Allenby, Ronald Arkin and Edward T. Barrett, "International Governance of
Autonomous Military Robots," Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 12 (2011): 289.
3
Ibid, 289.
4
Ibid, 289.
5
Michael N. Schmitt and Jeffrey S. Thurnher, "Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of
Armed Conflict," Harvard National Security Journal 4, no. 2 (2013): 251.
6
Robert Sparrow, "Killer Robots," Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2007): 63.
2
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feasible and malleable norms that can be accomplished under existing policy and legal
constraints, and therefore can be assessed and improved upon when necessary.7 In other words,
good governance is not codified, but rather is a set of agreed upon norms that states can use
when conducting operations, and it is understood that other states will adhere to these norms as
well. Since they are not codified, states are able to re-evaluate and change these norms where
necessary, for example the introduction of new technologies or new conflict environments. Good
governance is a self-regulatory concept in which states hold each other accountable to a certain
level of behaviour. Bode Ingvild and Henrick Huelss specialize in international politics and
relations, and define norms as “standards of appropriateness for specific practices,” allowing for
broad guiding principles for states to adhere to.8 In other words, the fundamental and procedural
norms set out in existing principles of international law shape how states will act and provide
standards for “appropriate” warfare.9 As broad principles, they allow for a wider range of
interpretations and scenarios in which they can be deemed applicable. Therefore, the malleability
and self-regulatory nature of good governance allows for states to adapt to new technologies,
such as AWS, and create new standards that are more inclusive of these developments as they
happen.
IHL presents key legal steps when conducting an attack, which provides states and
military commanders with a standardized approach to warfare. Alan Blackstrom and Ian
Henderson summarize these steps as: collective information about a target; analyzing said
information in order to determine the lawfulness of the target at the time of the attack;
understanding the potential incidental effects of the weapon and taking precautions to minimize

7

Marchant et al., 2011: 291.
Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss, "Autonomous weapons systems and changing norms in international relations,"
Review of International Studies, Vol. 44 (2018): 407.
9
Ibid, 407-408.
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them; assessing the proportionality of those effects against the anticipated military advantage of
the attack; firing the weapon at the directed target; and monitoring the situation in order to cancel
or suspend the attack if necessary.10 In other words, in order for an attack to be considered
lawful, it must adhere to the principles of distinction and proportionality, have collected all
necessary information to have an exhaustive and conclusive understanding of the environment in
which the attack will be made, and employ mitigation strategies in case an attack goes array.
This list of relatively simple tasks becomes far more complicated with AWS, as the more
complex a weapon is, the greater the potential is for discrimination to be affected by design
errors or manufacturing errors.11 This creates issues in anticipating the actions of these AWS and
ensuring their compliance with these norms. If we are unable to anticipate the actions of an
AWS, we are unable to reasonably have all the information necessary to ensure a lawful attack,
as well as be confident that the AWS will be able to accurately calculate the proportionality of
the attack before firing, or suspend or cancel their attack if necessary.
In order to ensure greater confidence that AWS will be able to conduct a lawful attack, it
may be necessary to have safeguards in place to intervene and ensure effective compliance if the
AWS itself cannot confidently do so. It is important, therefore, to have what Geoffrey Corn calls
LOAC compliance enablers.12 These can include military commanders and programmers who
can ensure that the weapon has the capability to follow those key legal steps.13 This approach has
been used when issuing orders to subordinate units; for example, a unit of soldiers is told by their
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Alan Blackstrom and Ian Henderson, "New capabilities in warfare: an overview of contemporary technological
developments and the associated legal and engineering issues in Article 36 weapons reviews," International Review
of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (2012): 485.
11
Ibid, 486.
12
Geoffrey S. Corn, "Autonomous weapons systems: managing the inevitability of 'taking the man out of the loop,'"
In Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy, ed. Nehal C. Bhuta et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2016):
224.
13
Ibid, 224.
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commanding officer what their task is and the purpose of that task.14 Therefore, Geoffrey Corn
translates this idea to AWS, demonstrating how maximizing the articulation of this “task and
purpose” within the intended tactical function of the AWS will facilitate compliance with the
LOAC.15 In other words, Corn argues that by having the developer program the AWS with
certain functions capable of objectives while adhering to principles such as distinction and
proportionality, and by having the military commander deploy the AWS within specific
parameters into attack and monitoring its actions, this will create more confidence in the AWS’s
ability to comply with the LOAC. Corn additionally argues that this increased oversight of the
development of AWS allows for better assessments of the potential risk of LOAC violation,
which in turn will help define the weapon’s purpose and intended use; therefore, the
development phase of AWS is decisive in establishing LOAC compliance confidence.16 By
being more involved in the development of the AWS, officials are able to determine the
capabilities of the AWS and therefore determine how and where it should be used to maximize
confidence of LOAC compliance.
In terms of concrete codified law, the 1977 Additional Protocol I (API) to the 1949
Geneva Conventions provides a comprehensive outline for weapons law and LOAC. Article 36
of the API has required that a High Contracting Party is under obligation to determine whether a
new weapon, means or method of warfare that it is developing or acquiring may be prohibited by
the Protocol or any other rule of international law that the High Contracting Party is party to. 17
This links to Corn’s argument, that it is important for States to have oversight over the
development of a new weapon, such as an AWS, to ensure that its functionality is capable of

14

Ibid, 224-225.
Ibid, 225.
16
Ibid, 225-228.
17
Ibid, 227.
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complying with the LOAC. Additionally, under this article, it is required of states that are party
to this API to conduct legal reviews of all weapons being developed to ensure they meet the
requirements laid out in the API.18 These reviews are self-regulatory, rooted mainly in customary
international law and norms. Article 38 is considered to embody the customary law of obligation
regarding weapons and therefore acts as a starting point for understanding weapons law.19 It
includes a wide range of weapons and how they should be used, which can be considered
unlawful in itself or unlawful in the way that it is used in certain circumstances only. 20 This
provides a very broad approach to understanding and governing weapons. Article 51(4)(c) of the
API also details that weapons systems that have uncontrollable effects, despite being able to
strike their targets accurately, are not allowed.21 Article 50(1) deals with more “human” aspects
of conflict, specifically looking at doubt and its role during an attack.22 Article 50(1) explains
that “doubt as to status of a person must be resolved in favour of treating that individual as a
civilian” during an attack.23 This threshold for doubt is, however, framed in terms of human
reasonableness, and therefore complicates translation for AWS.24 This is not to say that it cannot
be done; algorithms that can precisely measure doubt and reliability of target identification can
mitigate this issue, providing these systems with all the information necessarily to act as if they
were a reasonable human attacker.25
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Ibid, 28.
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Ultimately, a main concern when determining whether AWS will ever be able to conduct
themselves in the nuanced way necessary to comply with international law rests in the two key
principles of international LOAC: distinction and proportionality. The two substantive rules
within the API are codified in Article 54(b)(4) and Article 35(2).26 These two rules determine the
lawfulness of the weapons themselves; the first stating that a weapon is deemed indiscriminate if
it cannot be aimed at a specific target, and the second stating that a weapon is deemed
disproportionate if its nature is to cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury to
combatants.27 It is important, therefore, to delve further into these principles and examine
whether AWS have the capabilities to comply with them in order to better understand their place
within the legal landscape.
Distinction
Distinction, also referred to as discrimination, is a crucial element of international law
which protects civilians and civilian objects. This principle is codified in law through Article 48
of the API, stating that: “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”28 This means that states have an
obligation to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, and military targets from civilian
objects, in order to protect civilians and ensure that they are only attacking targets that fulfill
their military objective. Civilian objects are those that are “indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population,” as well as the natural environment, historic monuments, places of worship

26

Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, "Law and ethics for autonomous weapon systems: why a ban won’t
work and how the laws of war can," Hoover Institution, Stanford University (2013): 10.
27
Ibid, 10.
28
Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 251.
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and works of art.29 Additionally, distinction requires that attacks be limited to military objectives,
and defines a military objective as “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”30
There is little difference between the application of these rules governing attacks on individuals
and objects, but ultimately AWS that lack the capability to distinguish between lawful and
unlawful targets may be considered illegal under the Protocol.31 There are AWS that have been
developed with this capability; for example, the South Korean military developed a stationary
sentry robot that is capable of detecting and selecting targets, as well as respond with lethal or
non-lethal force depending on the circumstances at the time, without human input.32
Additionally, the Phalanx Close In Weapons Systems for Aegis class cruisers in the US Navy are
capable of autonomously conducting their own searches, detection, evaluation, tracking and
killing of targets.33 Therefore, in order for an AWS to be considered discriminatory in nature, it
must have the ability to distinguish its target from non-targets, and aim in a way that only attacks
that target. It must also have the ability to actively survey its area and make distinctions
throughout the course of its military operation.
Distinction is not always black and white in terms of identifying civilian and military
objects. Distinguishing between military and non-military objects becomes more difficult with
the labelling of targets as “suspected terrorists;” persons in this category in armed conflict are

29

Markus Wagner, "Autonomy in the Battlespace: Independently Operating Weapon Systems and the Law of
Armed Conflict," In International Humanitarian Law and the Changing Technology of War vol. 41. Edited by Dan
Saxon (Leiden, Brill: 2013): 110.
30
David Akerson, "The Illegality of Offensive Lethal Autonomy," In International Humanitarian Law and the
Changing Technology of War vol. 41, ed. Dan Saxon (Leiden, Brill: 2013): 77-78.
31
Schmitt, 2013: 18.
32
James Foy, "Autonomous Weapons Systems: Taking the Human out of International Humanitarian Law,"
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2014): 50.
33
Ibid, 51.
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prima facie, or at first appearance, civilians and are protected as such until they participate
directly in the hostilities.34 Determining whether a civilian is actually directly participating in the
conflict requires analyzing whether that participation is “direct or indirect, continuous or
sporadic, and caused a sufficient level of harm of a military nature.”35 This, therefore, creates a
highly subjective scenario for a soldier, or AWS, to decipher in order to apply the principle of
distinction, and the question remains whether AWS have the capability to perform such tasks.36
Some difficulties can also arise for the attacker in cases where they must distinguish between
civilian and military objects when said object can be classified as both civilian and military in
purpose.37 An example of this could be a bridge an army uses to get supplies; the bridge can be
considered to serve a civilian purpose as it was designed for civilian commuting, but can also be
considered to serve a military purpose as the army is using it to transport its supplies, and
therefore aids the army in gaining supplies and building their attack. 38 Thus, the attacker must be
able to make the decision as to whether or not it serves more of a civilian or military purpose at
the time of the attack. The uncertainties surrounding the ability of AWS to discriminate between
seemingly undetermined individuals to determine which are legitimate military targets and which
are not raise some serious concerns regarding discrimination.39 This malleable identity can cause
issues for AWS, as their software would have to be capable of constantly re-evaluating and redefining their targets depending on their interactions, as well as being able to identify when an
individual is in fact participating in the conflict. Thus, there are a myriad of considerations to

34

Liu, 2012: 645.
Akerson, 2013: 77.
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Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 160.
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make when designing an AWS to ensure that it has the capabilities to accurately comply with the
principle of distinction.
This principle not only details rules pertaining to the attacker, but also outlines guidelines
for the weapons themselves. Article 51(4)(a) states that attacks that are not directed at a specific
target and but rather strikes to lawful targets without discrimination are banned.40 This article is
particularly important for AWS, as it is different than the ban on indiscriminate weapons because
this ban also involves weapons that have the capability to aim at a lawful target, but do not do
so.41 Therefore, under this Article, AWS must have and use sensors to enhance their ability to
distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets.42 However, this becomes far more difficult the
more complex a mission becomes. An AWS can only compute a given procedure under the
confines in which its code was written, and therefore may not be able to sufficiently operate
within those confines in order to properly identify what is and is not a target.43 For example,
using the example of the “suspected terrorist” laid out above, if an AWS is not coded to be able
to properly identify when an individual becomes directly involved in a conflict, it is unable to
comply with the principle of distinction. This also can produce some difficulties, as the principle
of distinction not only requires the proper distinction of legitimate and illegitimate targets, but
also requires that an attack be carried out by weapons that have the capability to prosecute the
attack in a discriminatory way.44 For example, an AWS must be able to attack a target without
attacking other objects in the process; if it is the case where an AWS is in a position where it is
unable to discriminately attack its target, it must be able to abort in order to adhere to the
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principle of distinction. Therefore, their underlying software would have to be sophisticated
enough to determine whether a target it civilian or military in nature, and would have to be coded
to take into account uncertainty and abort the attack if needed.45
Civilians are a central focus of this principle, specifically regarding a duty of constant
care to ensure that civilians and civilian objects are spared during conflict. This duty of constant
care, in terms of AWS in attacks, would include the procurement of said AWS and its
preparation for deployment, as well as the deployment and its operation in the battlefield.46
Article 57(2)(a)(i) amplifies this by requiring that combatants “… do everything feasible to
verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not
subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of
Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol of attack them
accordingly.”47 In other words, the attacker must collect all relevant information to ensure the
validity of their target’s identity, and that the target is in fact a military objective and not a
civilian or civilian object. This includes preparing the mission, programming the autonomous
software, reviewing the available information, prescribing the areas to be searched and when,
and setting the target identification criteria for the weapon in order to ensure that it is able to
appropriately adhere to the obligations under this Article.48 However, feasibility is very
subjective, and invokes human judgement and discretion in order to make these decisions.49 This
feasibility, therefore, is ultimately an issue of reasonableness, and under the LOAC, it would
require an attacker to assume greater risk to avoid damage if a reasonable attacker in the same or
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similar situation would do the same. 50 With the subjectivity of this aspect of distinction, an AWS
alone may not be able to comply, as it is not able to operate in a way that allows for reason in its
current definition, which is inherently human-focused.
Reasonableness and feasibility are both understood in an innately human and subjective
way, and therefore present an obstacle for defining AWS within this principle. For example, the
Geneva Convention cites “common sense” as a requirement for being a combatant, and thus this
would render AWS as potentially unlawful, as machines are unable to conduct this type of
reasoning due to their programming. 51 Noel Sharkey, a specialist in the ethics of robotics, argues
that common sense is still necessarily for reasoning and making discrimination decisions, and
therefore this lack of “battlefield awareness” renders AWS unable to have the independent
facility to operate on the principles of distinction with the limited constrains in which they are
coded.52 As common sense is grounded in rationality and reason that require a broader scope of
decision-making, this argument follows that the constraints that are programmed into AWS
render it incapable of having common sense and operating within this space. It would logically
follow that in order for this “common sense” requirement to be met, an AWS must be supervised
by a superior human operator in order to be considered compliant with the principle of
distinction in this sense.
Proportionality
Proportionality works in tandem with distinction, focusing on the scale of the attack and
its effects on civilians. This principle is codified in Articles 51(5)(b) and 57(2)(a)(iii) of the API,
prohibiting: “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to

50

Schmitt and Thurnher, 2013: 261.
Sharkey, 2012: 789.
52
Ibid, 789.
51

15
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”53 Therefore, proportionality
requires a combatant, before attacking, to weigh the potential loss of civilian lives against the
military advantage, and determine whether that loss would be proportional to the advantage,
meaning that the effects would balance each other out. This proportional weighing of potential
harm to civilians and civilian objects and the potential military advantage of the attack requires
contextual and discretionary decision-making with emphasis on reasoning.54 However, as seen
with distinction, reasonableness is vague and subjective, and therefore makes it difficult to
uniformly enforce and determine, especially in terms of AWS and their capabilities.
Regarding human combatants, the principle is considered one of the most complex and
misunderstood norms in the law of armed conflict in terms of interpretation and application.55
Michael Schmitt and Jeffrey Thurnher, both experts in international and military law, argue that
this occurs because core notion of proportionality lies within the idea of “excessiveness.”56 With
no accepted definition of excessive in the law of armed conflict, determining excessiveness is
done on a case-by-case basis, evaluating it in terms of reasonableness within the given
circumstances of the action.57 It therefore follows that excessiveness can be looked at through the
idea that the greater the reasonably anticipated military advantage that might occur from the
attack, the more the law will tolerate the expected collateral damage of said attack.58 IHL
presents that proportionality rests on the notion that “belligerents must exercise restraint in the
face of highly uncertain environments,” and decisions regarding proportionality should be
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weighed against dynamic environments through highly qualitative and subjective knowledge.59
However, this becomes difficult for AWS, as their programming is constrained in terms of its
decision-making process and is unable to process information in a qualitative and subjective
way, and thus may not be able to make the calculations necessary to appropriately comply with
proportionality.
There are some ways that AWS can be designed to ameliorate their decision-making
abilities to better comply with the principle of proportionality. Not all AWS are capable of
proportionality; for example, landmines can be considered AWS, as the decision to detonate is
made by the machine, but they are simply programmed to detect the intended scenario and
detonate.60 This programming is very simple, consisting of a mechanical spring or arrangement
that is unable to calculate proportionality.61 AWS, however, can be programmed to have predetermined parameters for when they can and cannot attack to adhere to proportionality.62 This
can be done through programming “doubt values” to increase reasonableness in decision making,
and ensure there are adequate sensors to ensure the correct identification of targets and other
civilian individuals and objects.63 In this sense, Schmitt and Thurnher interpret reasonableness in
terms of a calculation based in “doubt,” and the amount of doubt there is regarding a target or the
attack’s effect. Therefore, reason becomes quantified and tangible for AWS to process and input
into their actions. These parameters can also be set by programming relative judgement into an
AWS, which will allow it to measure anticipated civilian harm and military advantage, subtract
and measure the balance against a standard of “excessiveness,” and, if excessive, not attack.64
59
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Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman – a scholar of international and technology law, and
scholar of international law and LOAC, respectively – thus turn this relative judgement into a
concrete calculation that is weighted against a set coded standard, allowing the AWS to be able
to make these decisions. Although this technically fails to holistically approach proportionality in
the way that international law has traditionally expected, it provides a method for which AWS to
adhere to the principle in their own way. Though the type of reason that has traditionally been
linked to proportionality has relied mainly on human judgement and subjectivity, looking at
proportionality as Schmitt and Thurnher, and Anderson and Waxman, have, makes it possible to
understand reason in a more quantitative way, and therefore allow for an interpretation of the
principle that fits with AWS.
Proportionality and the concept of excess can also be viewed through the concepts of
“superfluous injury [and] unnecessary suffering.”65 Schmitt and Thurnher note that Article 35(2),
the article that addresses this concept, only addresses the effect of weapons systems on target
individuals, and not the actual manner of engagement, and therefore AWS would not
automatically violate this principle.66 This, therefore, states that AWS are able to comply with
proportionality and causes harm that determines whether or not the effect was proportional or
not. William Boothby, a leading authority in new weapons technologies and the development of
international law, argues that the autonomous nature of AWS would not likely directly contribute
to the degree of suffering or injury, but rather the munition that is being delivered to the target. 67
In other words, he argues that AWS are capable of complying with this principle so long as the
human operator in charge of loading the weapon or choosing its munition would be responsible
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for ensuring proportionality. However, Markus Wagner, a scholar specializing in IHL and the
technology of war, argues that AWS can be able to determine what type of effect and munition to
use to produce an attack in any given circumstance, and understand the weighting of the effect
on the military objective and civilian population.68 This would thus eliminate the need for human
supervision, but would require the AWS to have the capability to calculate the proportionality of
its attack before choosing its method. This, therefore, adds another element to the proportionality
calculations that the AWS would need to be capable of making for itself.
The question regarding AWS therefore is whether they are capable of performing these
proportionality calculations properly. The decision of proportionality rests on assessing and
processing complex data that can sometimes be based on contradictory signals if they are
measured against a preprogrammed set of action criteria that tend to be characteristic of AWS.69
Thus, proportionality calculations must subjectively determine the “value” of the anticipated
military advantage gained from the attack and weigh it against the harm expected to civilians and
civilian objects, and take precautions or ultimately forfeit the attack if there is too high of a
degree of doubt.70 However, there still remains a level of vagueness when it comes to these
calculations, even though they rely on pre-set parameters which make the decision-making
process of the AWS much more stringent. Therefore, AWS do not have the capability to properly
calculate proportionality, as their programming limits them from doing so.
These calculations are simply not holistic or malleable enough to ensure adequate
compliance with the principle of proportionality. Pablo Kalmanovitz argues that simply setting
threshold values for proportionality assessments within narrow settings does not get rid of human
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judgement, but rather makes it indispensable.71 AWS themselves are incapable of making the
type of judgements that proportionality currently requires, even with human-made algorithms
and choices.72 AWS also lack the reasonableness to balance the two sides of the proportionality
calculation in a meaningful way.73 Thus, as Kalmanovitz argues, that the test of proportionality
will ultimately rest on the human decision to deploy the AWS, assess “in good faith” and
according to “common sense” whether the weapon is able to act proportionally given the
algorithm and action parameters, and in the specific conditions of its deployment.74 In other
words, a human must make the decision to deploy an AWS based on its judgement, but the AWS
itself is still capable of acting proportionally. Therefore, though there is still a need for human
supervision, an AWS does have the capability to calculate proportionality if the parameters of
the military operation allow for it to do so and is not too complicated as to render the decision
out of the scope of the programming’s decision-making capabilities.
ROBOTS ON TRIAL: EXPLORING RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY
This section of the paper it will examine the different options for attributing
responsibility for the actions of AWS. Before exploring this topic further, and exploring the
different roles and responsibilities of the developer and military commander with regards to
AWS, it is important to understand the definitions of responsibility and liability. Andreas
Matthias specializes in the ethics of new technologies, and presents that an agent can only be
held responsible if they know the particular facts that surround their action, they are able to
freely form a decision to act, and are able to select one of the suitable available alternative
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actions based on the facts of the given situation.75 For an AWS, as their behaviours and ability to
make decisions are based on pre-determined code and parameters, they are unable to freely make
decisions and do not have full control over their behaviour, which makes them unable to be held
responsible under this definition.
This definition of responsibility reflects a more human-focused idea of responsibility, and
therefore responsibility of an AWS or other technology must be defined differently. Giovanni
Sartor and Andrea Omicini are scholars in law and artificial intelligence, and computer science
and autonomous systems, respectively. They present three notions of responsibility concerning
technology: functional responsibility, blameworthiness and legal liabilities for harm.76
Functional responsibility assumes that “the harm would not have resulted had the responsible
component correctly exercised the function attributed to it.”77 In other words, if the machine had
been functioning correctly, specifically the component of the AWS that was caused harm to the
object of individual, said harm would not have occurred; essentially, it is harm caused by a
malfunction or error. This means that any component or subcomponent of the system could fail
to exercise its expected function and therefore have harmful consequences for which the
malfunctioning component may be considered responsible.78 For example, failure in the system’s
sensor causes the weapon to be incapable of adhering to the principle of distinction and harms an
innocent civilian; therefore, the failure of the sensor can be considered responsible for the AWS
not complying with the principle of distinction and the harm caused. Blameworthiness continues
this idea by stating that the fact that the failure that caused the harm involves a fault.79 Faulty
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design of a weapon system could result in its inability to exercise the function that is attributed to
it; for example, if a computer supporting an autopilot in a drone burns out due to a design failure,
and an accident occurs, then the fault should be allocated to the developers of the computer.80
The third notion of legal liabilities for harm can be related to a number of forms of liability, such
as strict liability, vicarious liability, product liability and negligence.81 Under these two notions,
responsibility can also be attributed to the humans who work on and with the AWS, such as the
developers who design the weapons and military commanders who deploy them, and not just the
functional aspects of the weapon itself.
Criminal and international law recognizes this notion of shared responsibility, and allows
agents associated with the performance and actions of an AWS to be considered responsible for
its actions. Neha Jain is a legal scholar who specializes in public international law, and explores
how criminal law recognizes that there are instances in which responsibility can be shared, as the
immediate agent who is most directly related to the offence is “autonomous” in the material
sense, but another agent can still be held responsible for their conduct.82 In other words, even
though the agent who committed the act did so of their own ability, another agent could still be
responsible for those actions based on their relationship with the immediate agent, such as the
one who commanded the attack. She explains that criminal and civil law systems recognize that
there are various categories of perpetration and principal responsibility.83 Most consistently in
these systems, a person is considered a principal through personal fulfillment of both the action
(actus reus) and the intent (mens rea), but some systems recognize that principal responsibility
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can come even when the accused acts “through” another.84 For example, a military commander
acting “through” his soldiers, since he was the one to deploy the troops and give them the
military operation.
There are two concepts that help give guidance for how to attribute responsibility. One
concept is the “innocent agent”, who is an individual whose actions are not deemed “free,
informed or voluntary” due to factors such as ignorance, insanity or minority, which in turn can
be regarded as having been “caused” by the conduct of another person.85 AWS can, thus, be
considered an innocent agent, as their actions are not free or voluntary due to the nature of their
behaviour being pre-determined by another person. They also present the idea of the “semiinnocent” agent, which applies when perpetrators actions are considered not fully voluntary, but
not to the extent that it would absolve them of criminal responsibility; they can be characterized
as having “caused” to the extent that they did not possess the complete knowledge necessary to
fully comprehend the nature or circumstances of their conduct.86 The mens rea of the direct
perpetrator therefore must be judged in terms of the secondary party’s mental state, and will
require intent or knowledge.87 This can also apply to AWS, as their code gives them the ability to
perform some decision-making capabilities, and therefore be able to comprehend certain
elements of their actions. However, ultimately, their actions are limited by a human agent, who
sets parameters for how they are able to act. Therefore, responsibility can be shared by both the
AWS and another human counterpart who is involved in its behaviours and actions.
Responsibility does not only occur when the act happens, but rather can be attributed at
any time throughout the operation. According to specialist in the ethics of artificial intelligence
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and autonomous systems Johannes Himmelrich, responsibility can be forward-looking and
backward-looking.88 Forward-looking responsibility refers to “obligations to manage risks,
perform certain actions, or produce certain outcomes.”89 This encompasses the obligations under
IHL and the LOAC laid out above, in that actors are held responsible for complying with these
principles and norms. For example, under this concept of forward-thinking responsibility, a
military commander is responsible for ensuring that all systems are functioning properly in an
AWS before deploying it, and programming it with the parameters necessary to ensure the
intended military objective is met. Backward-looking responsibility refers to “what an agent
acquires because of what she has done or brought about that grounds permission of other agents
to react to this agent in certain ways.”90 In other words, the actor can be held responsible for their
the results of their actions after they have been committed. For example, if an AWS harms an
innocent civilian during their mission, then it and/or someone connected to the machine’s actions
must be held responsible for the harm done to that civilian.
This backward-looking responsibility is the most common way of thinking about
responsibility, and presents a more holistic approach to attributing responsibility for an
unintended result. Himmelreich explains that when an agent is responsible in this backwardlooking sense, then others are justified in holding them responsible in terms of attributability,
accountability and answerability.91 In terms of attributability, responsibility is determined by
express or constitute judgement of a person’s action and of the person themselves.92 In other
words, responsibility is attributed to someone based on the judgement of an official legal body.
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Thus, attribution of responsibility is determined in an ununiform and case-by-case basis
depending on the facts of the case and the judgement of those proceeding over the case. In terms
of accountability, responsibility is determined by justifying taking a “certain stance towards this
person and forming evaluative or emotive attitudes, such as blame, praise, or resentment, as a
part of this stance.”93 This means that accountability is determined through both qualitative
analysis and emotional response; for example, to hold someone accountable for the harm caused
by an AWS, it must be determined that the person was involved in process of that harm
occurring, such as programming the system or determining the operation parameters, and can
attribute blame to that person’s fault. Himmelreich, however, argues that responsibility need not
always involve accountability and blameworthiness, but rather involve that an agent by
answerable for their actions and apologize for the harms that ensued.94 Answerability can be
determined by assessing and questioning the reasons the agent took in justifying their actions in
order to justify the attitudinal stances taken.95 This aspect of responsibility becomes more
muddied with AWS, as with their complex systems, it is hard to accurately determine its
decision-making process and therefore make it difficult, if not impossible, to assess the reasoning
or justification for its actions. However, determining answerability for AWS can take a different
approach by assessing the initial code written by the developer, or the reasoning for deploying
the AWS in the way that it was with the guidance or military objectives it received. Although
this may not be able to specifically determine the reasons for the actions taken by the AWS, it
will give a better idea of the decision-making process and reasoning by understanding the predetermined parameters within which it was operating.
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To bring it back to forward-looking responsibility, liability can be attributed based on
whether an actor failed to take precautions in order to ensure compliance with IHL and the
LOAC. Boothby presents that there is no liability for “the damage lawfully done to military
objectives, for the death or injury lawfully caused to members of the opposing armed forces, for
expected death, injury or damage to civilians or civilian objects which is not excessive in relation
to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, or for the death or injury of civilians or
damage to civilian objects caused by mistaken or erroneous attacks caused, for example, by the
malfunction of military equipment.”96 In other words, since these actions are considered lawful
under the principles of distinction and proportionality, as well as other principles codified in law,
the agent who caused these effects will not be held liable for them. Liability, therefore, rests in
damage caused by the failure to take all feasible precautions in relation to the attack operation
which results in disobeying the law.97 For example, excessive harm to civilians caused by an
AWS that failed to complete all necessary proportionality calculations is liable for that harm,
since it did not take all feasible precautions by not completing all of the calculations. This could
occur because of a developer not programming all the possible calculations into the AWS’s
software, or the military commander not providing the appropriate parameters or information
needed to perform the tasks.
With AWS, there exists that problem of responsibility gaps in determining liability and
responsibility, as it becomes difficult to attribute individual responsibility to the actions of an
AWS due to the nature of its programming and operation. Himmelreich explains that
responsibility gaps occur when an AWS harms someone but there is no one responsible for that
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harm.98 He goes on to explain that these responsibility gaps seem to only occur when minimal
agents that have intentional agency but not moral agency are used in conflicts; they have
intentional agency in the sense that they can form beliefs, decision and actions but they cannot be
responsible for those actions without that moral agency.99 An agent has moral agency if their
actions originate within themselves and reflect their end, which must come from their capacity to
reason on the basis of their past experiences, and this end must have been chosen by
themselves.100 Therefore, an AWS does not have moral agency because even though their actions
do originate within themselves from their coding and software, their software was written and
determined by someone else, and their end was, to an extent, chosen by someone else who
decided their military objectives. Sartor and Omicini build on this by articulating that the
deployment of AWS could determine responsibility and liability gaps due to their impossibility
to attribute moral responsibility and legal liabilities to anyone based on harms caused by the
AWS’s autonomous operation.101 Since their autonomous operation causes a diminishing
influence of their human operators and developers, this creates a responsibility gap in that these
humans can be considered too far removed from the actions of the AWS to be held responsible
for those actions.
The idea of attributing responsibility to AWS can been compared to the use of child
soldiers in war. Sparrow explains that while children can be argued to lack full moral authority,
they are autonomous and are capable of acting and making decisions on their own, just like
AWS.102 He argues that they are not appropriate objects of punishment, as they are not capable
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of fully understanding the moral dimensions of what they are doing and therefore understanding
their crime and punishment.103 However, the limited autonomy that these child soldiers do have
is enough to ensure that those who order them into doing those actions do not control them,
which makes attributing responsibility problematic.104 Sparrow explores a space where these
children are sufficiently autonomous to make it difficult to attribute responsibility to appropriate
adults, but not autonomous enough to be responsible for their own actions, and argues that it
should be the person who placed them in the position where they played the causal role who
should be held responsible.105 Analogous with this example, AWS have the ability to act on their
own without immediate control, but these actions are pre-determined based on their coding and
the military objectives delivered to them. Therefore, the person who is held responsible can be
the person who developed the weapon and pre-determined its capabilities, or the commander
who deployed it and delivered its military objectives, as they were the ones involved in guiding
their actions.
The developers
Responsibility for the actions of an AWS can lie with the developer of that weapon, as
the design of the weapon contributes to its ability to perform tasks, and therefore the developer
plays a crucial role in determining the actions of an AWS. Although it is rarely an individual
who is solely in charge of developing, designing and programming the weapon, but rather more
likely a team who works together for a technological corporation, for the purposes of this paper,
developer will be used as a shorthand in explaining this responsibility attribution. The phases in t
the lifetime of a new weapon include concept, assessment, development, manufacture, in-service
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and disposal.106 This means that for a significant portion of the lifecycle of the AWS, the
developers are involved and in charge of determining how it is programmed, designed and
developed. Michael Schmitt argues that since a human, or rather team of humans, must decide
how to program a system, they would be accountable for programming it to engage in actions
that could amount to war crimes.107 Though he does argue that it is (hopefully) improbable that
the developers would design an AWS to commit war crimes, he explains that it would be much
more likely that a system that has not been programmed to do so is used in a manner that
constitutes a war crime.108 In this case, it could be argued that the developers be held responsible
for that war crime if the AWS is unable to discriminate between a combatant and non-combatant
due to the programming of its sensors. Sartor and Omicini also contribute to this debate, stating
that developers will be considered blameworthy when they “negligently or intentionally
contribute to delivering a device that either (a) would not achieve the intended function, or (b)
would achieve the intended function, but this function necessarily entails unacceptable
consequences.”109 Therefore, responsibility can be placed on developers that did not equip the
AWS with, for example, sensors and software that is capable of discriminating at the level
required for the intended task for harm caused to innocent civilians due to this error.110 The
developers are directly involved in determining the capabilities of the AWS, and therefore have a
role in their actions and decision-making.
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Developers play a role in the actions of AWS, and therefore can be responsible for them,
as their capacity to cause harm is a direct result of its design.111 Tim McFarland and Tim
McCormack, authors of “Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons Systems Be
Liable for War Crimes,” argue that the developers exert greater control over the range of actions
of the AWS and the specific actions it performs after its been deployed than the analogous
relationship between combatant and commander, and therefore responsibility for the proscribed
acts committed by an AWS can be more easily ascribed to the former relationship than the
latter.112 This is because these actions are pre-determined by the programming and design of the
AWS that the developers created. However, McFarland and McCormack go on to argue that to
the extent that weapon developers may be considered instigators of an action by an AWS, they
do so through control software, and the degree of control exercised by the developers depends on
the degree of autonomy of the AWS with respect to the action.113 In other words, as the degree of
autonomy increases – as in the less control an operator or commander has – the greater the share
of control the developers have over the behaviour of the AWS. Therefore, as long as the operator
of the AWS remains fully or partially connected to the operation of the weapon, the control is
shared between the developers and the operator in terms of the actions conducted.114 There may
be points during a conflict in which developers occupy control over the actions of a system such
that soldiers and commanders may be excluded and are unable to instigate or intervene in the
actions of the AWS.115 Thus, the developers are considered the primary determinants of the
AWS’s actions and behaviour, as they are the ones who program those capabilities.
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Due to the nature of the relationship between developers and AWS, the developers can be
held liable for the actions of their weapons as they determine what actions they are able to
conduct. McFarland and McCormack look at how mens rea requirements could be ground for
developers to be held liable, particularly within the definition given above regarding aiding and
abetting.116 They bring up the concept that in order for a person or persons to be held criminally
responsible, they must have committed the act in question with intent and knowledge, on the
basis that intent exists “when a person means to engage in conduct or cause a consequence, and
knowledge refers to awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events.”117 This means that the person or persons must have had full
knowledge of the circumstances under which the action happened, and intended for the action to
happen. However, McFarland and McCormack use the example of a judgement made in the Trial
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the trial of
Anto Furundžija.118 The judgement noted that “it is not necessary that the aider and abettor
should know the precise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed. If he is
aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in
fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an
aider and abettor.”119 In other words, developers do not need to have been involved in the
specific plans to commit the crime or intend for that specific crime to occur, but rather have
programmed behaviours into the AWS that would be capable of committing criminal acts.120 For
example, developers that knowingly programmed sensors that were not entirely accurate in
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detecting a target, or had limitations in certain circumstances, would be held responsible for an
AWS killing an innocent civilian because they were unable to distinguish between targets.
However, a prosecutor would need to demonstrate that these developers understood that the
weapon was capable of behaving in an illegal manner in order to be held liable.121 For example,
if an AWS was placed in an environment that its developers had not anticipated it to operate in,
and therefore its programming is not equipped to confidently and compliantly operate within that
environment, and there is a crime committed, this could absolve developers of liability as they
did not understand that the weapon could behave illegally as they did not understand how the
AWS would operate in this foreign environment.
There are different ways that these system limitations can come about that can produce
different levels of responsibility ascribed to developers. Robert Sparrow argues that fault could
lie with the person or persons who designed and/or programmed the AWS if the fault was a
result of negligence on the part of the design and/or programming team.122 In other words, fault
could be attributed to the developers if did not properly take all steps necessary to ensure that the
AWS was designed and/or programmed in a way that allowed it to function the way it was
intended without undue errors. He does argue, however, that this need not necessarily be the
case. He explores the possibility that the machine may attack the wrong targets due to an
acknowledged limitation of the system, and therefore if the manufacturers of the weapon have
made it clear to those who purchased or deployed the AWS, then they cannot be held
responsible.123 Using the example presented earlier, developers who know that an AWS is unable
to reliably detect targets in certain environments must tell the purchaser or deployer of the
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weapon that it should not be operated in those environments, as it has the possibility of
distinction error. Additionally, the connection between the programmers and the results of the
system which would attribute responsibility to them is broken as the system becomes more
autonomous.124 This is because as an AWS becomes more autonomous, the possibility that the
AWS will make a choice other than those predicted by its programmers and designers increases
as well.125 In other words, the developers become less responsible for the actions of an AWS as
they become more autonomous, as they are less likely to accurately predict its actions with
greater autonomy. Sparrow likens this to the relationship between a parent and child, making the
analogy that just as a parent is not responsible for the actions of their child after they have left
their care, programmers should not be responsible for the actions of their AWS after they have
“left”.126 The responsibility for the actions of an AWS attributed to developers becomes more
distant as those actions become further outside of the control of the developers if they are
deployed to operate outside of their operational limits, and as their degree of autonomy increases,
as both of these instances have the possibility to cause unpredictable effects.
Degrees of autonomy will influence the role of developers in terms of attributing
responsibility to them. Matthias builds on the idea of growing autonomy shifting the role of
developers in terms of responsibility for their “creation”.127 With increased techniques of
artificial intelligence programming being developed for these AWS, the developers’ role
becomes more distant as their code becomes more ambiguous, making it more difficult to isolate
and identify errors in the decision-making process of the AWS.128 Since this programming uses
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predicate logic that is not executed in the same linear fashion, but rather runs deductions though
inference rules, the flow of control in these systems is more difficult to describe.129 However, as
long as there is symbolic representation of the facts and rules involved in these deductions, there
are methods of checking the stored information to ensure that it is correct.130 Therefore, as long
as there is a way to assess how the decision-making process was made, and how the information
was gathered and interpreted by the AWS, developers can be held responsible for those actions if
they are found to be at fault in terms of how they programmed the system.
In AWS with greater levels of autonomy, the representation of information becomes even
more abstract and difficult to isolate and interpreted. The symbolic representation of this
information and flow control disappears and is replaced with a matrix of synaptic weights, which
cannot be interpreted directly and, therefore, any information stored in this network can only be
inferred indirectly through experimentation.131 This makes it incredibly difficult to ensure
predictability, as the network is constantly changing.132 Thus, this constantly changing network
makes it impossible for the developers of the system to eliminate errors, but rather forces them to
permit these errors so the system can learn and improve its operational performance.133 Even
with developers defining the operational parameters of the system, as well as define the alphabet
used and the semantics of its symbols, the system they create programs itself through this genetic
programming inherent in this autonomous network.134 This makes the AWS work essentially
outside of the observation of the developers, who is rendered unable to intervene manually.135
Due to the nature of these increasingly autonomous networks, it becomes harder to attribute
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responsibility to the developers, as they could not predict the actions of the AWS even though
they were the ones who programmed them. With this increased ability to self-learn, AWS
become more independent from their “creators”, and therefore can be considered acting on their
own outside of the realm of control of their developers.
Although responsibility can be diminished, it cannot be entirely removed from the
developers. Hin-Yan Liu is a legal scholar focusing in artificial intelligence and its legal
disruption, who explains how the complexity of the software can lead to the diminishing
influence of the developers on the AWS’s behaviour and conduct.136 He explains that though the
developers are able to program constraints to AWS behaviour, these constraints are likely to be
quite broad and abstract, and therefore will allow the AWS to act in a way that could be difficult
to predict given the range and complexity of the programming.137 He argues that because of this,
the obstacles of attributing responsibility regarding AWS are issues of control, predictability and
foreseeability, which ultimately work together to determine the manner in which the AWS are
developed and deployed.138 Therefore, responsibility is determined by the circumstances under
which the AWS is used, and determining the distribution of this responsibility is based on the
level of control, predictability and foreseeability each actor has in the situation.139 Liu illustrates
this disconnection in responsibility through exploring the individual roles of a developer or
commander of an AWS.140 The individual or individuals are responsible for fulfilling their
expectations and obligations that attach to their function of the AWS, and when they have

Hin-Yan Liu, "Refining responsibility: differentiating two types of responsibility issues raised by autonomous
weapons systems," in Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy, ed. Nehal C. Bhuta et al. (Cambridge:
Cambridge, 2016): 330.
137
Ibid, 330-331.
138
Ibid, 335.
139
Ibid, 335.
140
Ibid, 337.
136

35
fulfilled these obligations, they are deemed to have acted responsibly.141 For example, if the
developers have fulfilled their obligations to program the AWS to the best of their ability with
the appropriate constraints and notify the commander of the limitations of its designs, they are
deemed to have acted responsibly. However, Liu points out that AWS behaviour also depends on
the commander who deploys it, and therefore this facilitates the displacement of blame from the
programmer to the commander.142 This is because the programmer can argue that they had
discharged their obligations by implementing the general parameters, and therefore the unlawful
system behaviour is the responsibility of the commander who failed to complement those
parameters with more specific constraints in the AWS’s deployment.143 In other words, if the
developers outline the parameters and limitations of the AWS to the commander, but they fail to
work within them causing harm to occur, then the developers cannot be held responsible for
those actions, as it was the commander who failed to deploy the AWS in the right circumstances.
Thus, it is important to explore the role and responsibility of military commanders regarding
AWS.
The military commander
The relationship between AWS and their military commander can be looked at as
analogous to the relationship between commander and soldier. Heather Roff, a specialist in the
law, policy and ethics of emerging technologies, explores this relationship through the doctrine
of command responsibility.144 This doctrine allows for the claim that commanders can be held
morally and legally responsible for the actions of their subordinates, and these commanders
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“should have known” what would happen.145 In other words, a commander should have known
the possible outcomes of a military operation or commands given to the soldiers. Therefore, if a
commander gives their soldiers an unlawful order, then they should have known unlawful
outcomes would occur and thus be held responsible for those outcomes. Command responsibility
is therefore premised on the fact that a superior-subordinate relationship does exist, and that the
test to see whether a person is a superior is one of “effective control.”146 Effective control
exculpates superiors from prosecution where a “person who is formally a superior in the line of
command may be excluded from criminal liability if that superior does not exercise actual
control.”147 Looking at AWS, Roff argues that effective control would exculpate commanders
from legal responsibility as they are unable to control the machines if they have a heightened
amount of autonomy.148 Similarly as with developers, as the level of autonomy increases in an
AWS, the level of control decreases for military commanders as the actions of the machine are
less predictable and foreseeable. Additionally, she states that AWS are “impossible” to control
“by a human in real-time due to its processing speed and the multitude of operational variables
involved,” and therefore there is no way for a commander to prevent or punish a violation of jus
in bello by said AWS.149 In other words, since the AWS is a self-regulatory system, it becomes
difficult for commanders to exercise control over them and therefore cannot be responsible for
the actions of the AWS. She continues by explaining that there can be no prevention of action as
there can be no foresight of the actions the AWS will take, and therefore can be no punishment
ascribed to the military commander.150 Though she does acknowledge that some responsibility
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can be attributed to commanders, as they made the decision to deploy the AWS, she argues that
this level of moral responsibility is relatively low.151 Therefore, the level of responsibility for
military commanders for the actions of an AWS becomes quite limited as their level autonomy
increases and diminishes the commander’s control over those actions.
Command responsibility and control can occur to varying degrees between a superior and
their subordinates. Himmelreich builds on the idea of control, and the differing degrees of
control that can exist between a commander and a subordinate.152 One way of understanding
control that he proposes is Robust Tracking Control, which outlines that an agent has control
over an outcome if that agent gave an order such that the outcome would occur in all relatively
similar circumstances.153 Conversely, if that agent did not give that order, the outcome would not
occur in all relatively similar circumstances.154 Robust tracking control also takes into account
errors and that control need not be perfect; it allows for risky actions in that the outcomes can
represent disjunctive descriptions and therefore the outcomes can include consequences that are
unintended.155 Therefore, this type of control can be attributed to commanders and the AWS they
deploy, in that if a commander deploys an AWS with the order to kill a specific target, it will do
so if all circumstances and parameters are appropriate for that outcome to occur, and it will occur
in similar situations. Since the AWS is unable to act in any way until they are activated, this
becomes the central decision of the commander and therefore places responsibility on the
commander to engage the AWS in any action.156 This means that the commander is responsible
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for the outcomes of the AWS as those outcomes would not have occurred had the order not been
given.
To illustrate this concept, Himmelreich provides an example regarding AWS and their
commanders. He provides a scenario in which a commander orders an AWS to patrol a large
region and engage legitimate targets.157 During the mission, communication is not maintained,
and the AWS identifies a potential target, which can only be engaged immediately.158 The AWS
takes the target to be legitimate and engages it, and the target turns out to be a legitimate
target.159 In this example, the commander does not have control over the actions of the AWS.
However, this is not because this particular target would be bombed if the commander were to
give the order, but rather because there is plausibility that in similar situations where the
commander gave the order, the AWS decides against the bombing of the particular target in
favour of bombing another.160 In this case, the commander is not responsible because this
particular bombing does not track control order, but at the least, the commander still has control
over whether or not they give an order.161 In other words, even though the commander has no
control over any of the particular bombings, they do have control over whether some targets
might be bombed.162 In this scenario, the commander would be held liable, but not directly
responsible, for the actions of the AWS. Himmelreich, therefore, presents two outcomes that
may arise from the deployment of this AWS: Outcome A, which states that this particular target
is bombed; and Outcome B, which states that some target is bombed or no target is bombed.163
He explains that outcome A represents a possible world where the AWS is deployed and the
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particular target is bombed; this represents the particular outcome.164 Outcome B, on the other
hand, is a probabilistic outcome, which represents a possible world where the AWS is deployed
and some target is bombed.165 In this world, if the commander were to give the order, then some
targets might be bombed; if the commander were not to give the order, no targets would be
bombed.166 Himmelreich argues that, within this context and with regards to the condition that
responsibility requires control, outcome B would render the commander responsible.167 Since the
commander has a certain level of control in deploying the AWS, knowing that there is the
possibility that a target other than the particular target may be bombed, that commander is
responsible for the actions of the AWS because if the order had not been given, no bombings
would occur at all. The decision to deploy the weapon, therefore, constitutes control and ascribes
responsibility to the commander.
The decision to deploy an AWS into the battlefield will ascribe responsibility for the
actions after deployment to the military commander that ordered it. Sparrow argues that by
making the decision to send the AWS into the battlefield, the commander is accepting the risk
that it might go awry.168 In other words, if is the case that the autonomy of the AWS rests on the
fact that its actions are not always reliably predictable and thus may cause unwanted deaths, then
the commander who deployed the weapon is held responsible for those unwanted deaths as they
understood that the weapon had the potential to kill people other than the intended target.169
However, he acknowledges that AWS have the capacity to choose their own targets, and
therefore with greater autonomy becomes less confidence in their reliability to attack the
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intended target.170 Thus, using the unpredictability of a system as the only aspect of autonomy is
incomplete; the use of AWS involves a risk that military personnel will be half responsible for,
even though they did not control its decisions, as autonomy refers to the machine’s ability to
determine its own actions.171 In other words, the military personnel would be responsible for
acknowledging and accepting the risk of deploying the AWS, as their actions can be
unpredictable, but are not directly responsible for their actions, as AWS have the capability to
determine their own actions. In this relationship, it is therefore necessary that there is a sort of
cooperation between the commander and the AWS, as the commander has the cognitive
understanding of the machine’s capabilities and monitor its progress towards the military
objective, similarly to a “human-like” sense of teamwork.172 Sparrow, therefore, accepts the
analogy of child soldiers (which was explored earlier) to better understand how to determine
responsibility. As with child soldiers, the possible solution to the responsibility gap identified in
this relationship is assigning responsibility to the military commander who issued the attack
order, but acknowledges that this solution may hold the commander responsible for things out of
their control and therefore leaves open the possibility that they be punished unfairly.173 Under
this analogy, a military commander could be held responsible for all actions of the AWS after its
deployment, which could ascribe more blame and fault than reasonable to the military
commander, as the actions of the AWS are not directly controlled by the commander but rather
merely influenced by the order to attack.
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Continuing with the analogy of the superior-subordinate relationship between soldiers
and their commanders, the relationship between AWS and their commanders can be analyzed in
a similar way. Jack McDonald, author of “Autonomous Agents and Command Responsibility,”
argues that military organizations have a “top-down” compliance structure.174 This means that
this structural compliance places constraints on individual autonomy and enables them to act
based on information passed on to them by others who are higher ranked.175 In terms of AWS,
this means that the actions that the weapons take are directly influenced and partially determined
by the commanders who set the parameters of their military operation. Aiden Warren and Alek
Hillas, authors of “Friend or frenemy? The role of trust in human-machine teaming and lethal
autonomous weapons systems,” follow this line of reasoning by arguing that the successful
adoption of AWS will depend on the direction of military commanders and will be reliant on
effective human-machine teaming to be reliable and perform correctly.176 They argue that this
relationship between humans and machines is necessary for the proper employment of AWS, and
therefore they are interconnected in terms of the actions that occur.177 In other words, these
humans will be held responsible for the actions of the AWS they operate because they are
directly in charge of ensuring the proper and reliable operation of the AWS before deployment
and during its mission. However, Sharkey argues that this human commander must have “full
contextual and situational awareness of the target area at the time of a specific attack and be able
to perceive and react to any change or anticipated situations that may have arisen since planning
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the attack.”178 In other words, the commander must be entirely aware of the circumstances of the
operation during the attack to the extent that they are able to intervene if need be. Therefore, the
military commander must always be monitoring the AWS and have the capability to intervene
during its mission in order to effectively be responsible for its actions. Kalmanovitz continues
this idea by arguing that military commanders must be confident that they have taken all
reasonable steps to adhere to the principles of distinction and proportionality, for which they
have a legal duty to do.179 He argues that if, for example, a commander is unable to anticipate the
range of action and corresponding risk with sufficient confidence, then it would be wrong to field
the weapon and possibly a case of criminal negligence, and therefore the commander who
fielded the weapon would be held criminally responsible for any mistakes that the AWS
makes.180 Military commanders are accountable for the deployment of the AWS as it is a
deliberate decision, and therefore any actions taken by the AWS after deployment directly stem
from that decision.181 Military commanders can therefore be considered linked to the AWS that
they deploy, making them responsible for their actions under their control and supervision.
Autonomy plays a large role in defining the superior-subordinate relationship in terms of
attributing responsibility. Corn elaborates on this relationship by linking command, LOAC
compliance and lawful combatant status together, explaining that under the law only individuals
who are capable of autonomous reasoning that are incorporated into the military organization
capable of managing that reasoning should be allowed to engage in hostilities.182 He explains
that the law establishes a high degree of confidence that an “autonomous human” will not use the
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power entrusted in them in an unconstrained manner, but rather exercise that autonomy within
the boundaries that their superior imposed on them to ensure legal compliance.183 In terms of
AWS, those constraints are pre-determined for them through their programming, and therefore
commanders are able to more confidently ensure legal compliance as these constraints are more
strictly binding to machines than human soldiers. However, this superior-subordinate
relationship obviously is not entirely analogous for AWS. For the soldier, training prior to being
put into the battlefield lays a foundation for the ongoing process of framing the exercise of
cognitive reasoning and independent judgement, and the military commander builds upon this
foundation by exercising their responsibility to develop the soldier through continued training. 184
Therefore, the development of an AWS becomes more crucial in determining its behaviour on
the battlefield, and creates an analogous counterpart to this training stage. However, Corn argues
that military commanders will not have a meaningful opportunity to influence the judgement and
reasoning of truly autonomous weapons, but rather deploy the weapons when a situation allows
that the capabilities of the particular AWS will produce the desired result.185 Therefore, the
military commander the military commander will have to have faith that the weapon has the
capacity to exercise the necessary cognitive judgement to comply with the LOAC.186 Thus, this
initial development phase is the decisive point in establishing parameters to ensure that the
cognitive functions of the AWS only are exercised within these parameters in order to comply
with the LOAC, as well as the military objectives and interests of the force.187 In other words, the
military commander must be able to work within the parameters of the AWS’s capabilities and
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deploy the weapon when they are confident that the circumstances under which it is deployed
will allow it to comply with the LOAC and produce the intended military objective. They are,
therefore, responsible for the actions of the AWS even though they are not directly involved in
determining its capabilities and judgement.
Command responsibility can be explained through two legal theories of criminal liability:
traditional accomplice liability and “should-have-known” command responsibility theory.188
Traditional accomplice liability is attributed when a commander shares the criminal intent and
acts in a way that contributes to or facilitates a violation of the LOAC through a subordinate.189
In other words, the commander knowingly deployed the AWS into a situation it was not
adequately equipped to operate within with the intent to cause undue harm to civilians, and
therefore would be held responsible for that harm. The “should-have-known” theory attributes
liability to a commander for foreseeable LOAC violations that are committed by their
subordinates, even when there is no proof that the commander shared the intent with the
subordinate, because the commanders are responsible for violations that they “should have
known” would occur.190 For example, the commander deploys an AWS in a situation that it was
not adequately equipped to operate within, but did not intend for undue harm to happen, but
should have known that this undue harm was a possibility in the circumstances under which the
AWS was deployed. Not all technology is neutral, and some have properties that make some
tasks easier to do than others; for example, some AWS may have constraints that make it easier
for them to operate in some environments over others.191 Therefore, even though the commander
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did not intend to cause the harm, they are still responsible for the actions that occurred as they
“should have known” the AWS was unable to operate accurately in these environments and
should have foreseen the possible LOAC violations. This theory provides that it is the
responsibility of the military commanders to ensure that any AWS that is deployed is reliable
and performs its capabilities in the ways expected of it.192 Corn sums up the idea of command
responsibility by stating that the concept of “mission command” is central to the planning and
execution of military operations, and is premised on the expectation that subordinates advance
the commander’s intent.193 In other words, the orders of the military commander directly dictate
the subordinates’ actions and therefore they follow through with the commander’s intent to
perform actions in order to achieve the military objective. For AWS, this means that the military
commander’s intent is advanced by the AWS as the commander gave the AWS the military
objectives knowing its capabilities, and the AWS performed actions in order to follow through
with those objectives.
Command responsibility can be understood as direct or indirect responsibility. Jain
explains that command responsibility is combination of direct and indirect responsibility in that
the commander is held directly responsible for their own failure to supervise or interevent, and
indirectly responsible for the criminal acts of their subordinates.194 She explains that the doctrine
includes three common characteristics: the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship
exists, there is a requisite mental element in that the superior knew or had reason to know of their
subordinates’ crimes, and that superior had failed to control, prevent or punish the subordinates
for those crimes.195 In other words, the commander should have had effective control over the
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subordinate at the time of the act, and that commander should have had the ability to prevent that
act.196 In terms of AWS, this doctrine would require that the military commander had control
over the AWS, through deployment and monitoring, during the criminal act, and had the ability
to intervene or abort the mission to prevent the act from happening. Regarding the mental
element, Article 28 of the Rome Statute states that a “should have known” or negligence
standard suffices for criminal liability.197 Article 28(1) also requires a causal connection between
the crimes committed by subordinates and the superior’s culpability, and therefore the superior’s
omission could have facilitated or encouraged the crimes, or increased the risk of crime.198 In
other words, if a commander deployed an AWS that was unable to appropriately function within
the parameters and environment in which it was deployed, the commander could be held liable as
they acted negligently. The duty to prevent exists when an offence is going to, or is about to,
occur and could materialize due to a commander failing to account for factors in their
subordinates that could give rise to the crime being committed.199 For AWS, this means that the
military commander must be aware of any offence that may occur due to the design of the AWS,
and by failing to account for the limitations in its d esign that caused the offence to occur, they
are held responsible for that offence. Therefore, a military commander must understand,
acknowledge and take into account the limitations of an AWS before deploying it to ensure that
it is limiting the risk of potential criminal activity, and is responsible for the actions of that AWS
that may occur due to these limitations.
There are, however, some issues that arise when attributing responsibility to the
commander of an AWS. Liu argues that because the commander acts at a later stage than the

196

Ibid, 311.
Ibid, 311.
198
Ibid, 311.
199
Ibid, 312.
197

47
developer, the commander’s ability to set constraints for the AWS is limited by and contingent
upon the constraints already implemented by the developer, and therefore this narrows the
commander’s control over the AWS and limits their predictability over the system’s
behaviour.200 Additionally, the replacement of a direct human operator of a weapons system by
an artificial counterpart could disrupt the superior-subordinate relationship required, because the
relationship has historically been an interpersonal one.201 Because of this, Liu argues that it
would be impossible to use the doctrine of command responsibility for an AWS due to a lack of
superior-subordinate relationship.202 Liu also explores the requirement of “effective control,”
arguing that the powers that the commander has to influence, suppress or prevent behaviours of
an AWS may be severely limited due to the technical parameters of the system, be contingent on
the technical knowledge and capabilities of the commander, and be impractical due to the
inability to meaningfully punish a machine.203 These considerations present obstacles in
presenting effective control over an AWS, and therefore cause issues in attributing responsibility
to the commander in charge of the AWS.204 Therefore, the relationship between AWS and their
commanders becomes more distant in that the commander’s ability to effectively control and
determine the AWS’s actions is limited by the design already pre-determined by the developer,
and thus the responsibility would be shared between the two in terms of being in control of the
AWS’s behaviours and actions.
CONCLUSION

200

Liu, 2016: 331-332.
Ibid, 332.
202
Ibid, 333.
203
Ibid, 333.
204
Ibid, 333.
201

48
With the rapid advancement of technology and the introduction of AWS into the
battlefield, it has become increasingly more important to explore how these robots will fit within
the international legal landscape. The current legal landscape, though not explicitly including
AWS within their rules and regulations, provides clear guidelines with which to contextualize
how AWS fit; through exploring their capabilities and matching them with principles of IHL and
LOAC, we are able to identify how AWS are able to comply with these rules and consequently
be deemed to have broken the law. For example, through the use of sensors, AWS are able to
adhere to the principle of distinction by being able to identify between targets and non-targets.
However, attributing responsibility and liability present a separate issue, as the requirements for
each are rooted in common sense and reasonableness, which are coded as inherently human
characteristics that require more abstract judgement that AWS are incapable of processing.
Therefore, we explore vicarious liability that can be attributed to the AWS’s developers and their
military commanders. Developers can be held responsible for the actions of AWS due to their
role in programming the weapons capabilities and parameters. Although the role of the developer
becomes more distant and diminished as the AWS operates in a more autonomous fashion, the
capabilities of the AWS are still pre-determined by the software and programming that they were
designed with, and therefore the developers are responsible for the actions made due to the
information that was programmed into the system. Military commanders can be held responsible
for the actions of AWS because they made the decision to deploy the weapon and determine its
military objectives. Though they are working within the confines and constraints of the
programming of the AWS, military commanders are still held responsible for the actions of the
AWS as they made the orders to the machine knowing its capabilities and limitations, predicting
the actions that could be taken to complete the military objectives, and therefore be held
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responsible for those actions. However, one cannot be responsible and the other not; since both
the developers and commanders are simultaneously involved with the behaviours and actions of
the AWS, they can be held jointly responsible for the actions of the AWS. Both play a role in
determining how the AWS will act and react in any given circumstance, and therefore both play
a role in the final effects of the AWS. Though the autonomous nature of AWS provides the
weapon itself with the ability to make its own decisions and take its own actions, it is ultimately
the influence of the developers and commanders that dictate those actions and, consequently,
their effects.
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